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We evaluate the impact of cooperation with public research institutions on firms' inno-
vative activities in France and Germany, using data from the fourth Community Innova-
tion Survey (CIS4). We propose an original econometric methodology, which explicitly 
takes into account potential estimation biases arising from self-selection and endoge-
neity, and apply it to both process and product innovation. We find a positive effect of 
cooperation on both types of innovation. This effect is significant in both countries, but 
much higher in Germany than in France. Drawing on a comparison of the institutional 
context of cooperation across both countries, we interpret this difference as a conse-
quence of the more diffusion-oriented German science policy. Finally, our robustness 
checks confirm the importance of controlling for selection and endogeneity. We show 
that these problems can be serious, and may lead to inconsistent estimates if ne-
glected. 
Keywords: Public/private research partnerships; University/industry linkages; Innova-
tiveness; Heckit procedure with endogenous regressors. 
JEL Codes: O31 - O33  - O38 
 
 Introduction  1 
1 Introduction 
Modern societies supposedly base their wealth on a steadily increasing and widely 
accessible knowledge base. This implies that new knowledge needs not only to be dis-
covered, but also to be diffused, i.e. it ought to be made readily available to the society, 
which will then be able to generate value from it. Most lines of research agree on the 
fact that interactions between industry and science are among the most prominent in-
stitutional interfaces for knowledge diffusion. This paper focuses on formal collabora-
tions between firms and public research institutions, and examines their impact on the 
innovativeness of firms using French and German data from the Fourth Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS4). 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we propose an econometric meth-
odology that tackles both selection and endogeneity issues. The fact that both issues 
may arise when estimating the effect of cooperation was left out of the focus of previ-
ous studies. Second, we extend our analysis to process innovation, whereas most of 
the previous studies focused on product innovation only. Last but not least, we are 
aware that any analysis of the interactions between different social actors (in our case 
scientific and economic ones) requires a detailed knowledge of the relevant institutional 
interfaces. We therefore develop a detailed comparison of the institutional contexts of 
cooperation with science in France and in Germany. This comparison will inform the 
interpretation of our econometric results. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we state the objective 
of our research, and discuss the interest and feasibility of a comparison between 
France and Germany. In Section 3, we sketch our conceptual framework and present 
our econometric methodology. Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation and discus-
sion of the results. We derive policy implications and conclude in a final section. 
2  Cooperation with science and success in innova-
tion: a comparative approach 
2.1  Objective of the research 
There is a fairly large consensus on the fact that modern societies base their wealth on 
the creation and diffusion of new knowledge. Seminal articles in the endogenous 
growth literature (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) focus on the expansion of 
the knowledge base and show its importance for economic growth. In a similar vein, 
Grossman and Helpman (1993) have shown that diffusion of new knowledge is a pre-
requisite for long-term increases in production and wealth. To favour diffusion, the or-
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ganisational setting should allow knowledge to move freely across institutional borders, 
and not to be stuck where it was created. Accordingly, the innovation systems ap-
proach argues that relationships and linkages between societal actors are central to 
their innovation behaviour. Extending this approach, the Triple Helix literature high-
lighted the importance of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz and Ley-
desdorff, 1998, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2000). The interaction between industry and sci-
ence is one of the most prominent institutional interfaces for knowledge diffusion. Al-
though knowledge transfer can occur through a variety of channels (see Schartinger et 
al., 2002, for an overview), we will focus in this article on formal collaborations between 
firms and public research institutions. The reason is that they play a key role in science 
and technology policy: they are often seen by governments as the best way to create 
strong links between industry and public research (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
Despite large differences in issues and methodological approaches, several studies 
show that collaboration with public research entails positive outcomes for firms. Monjon 
and Waelbroeck (2003) find that highly innovative firms benefit from official collabora-
tion projects with universities, whereas imitating firms benefit from spillovers. Lööf and 
Brostrom (2008) find positive impacts for large manufacturing firms. Similarly, Miozzo 
and Dewick (2004) focus on the question of whether inter-organisational cooperation 
enhances firm performance in construction industry and find that in some European 
countries there are positive effects from collaboration with universities. In the case of 
US-firms, Darby et al. (2004) find that firms participating in the Advanced Technology 
Program of the Commerce Department patent more frequently when a university also 
participates.  
In an effort to estimate the so-called ‘innovation function' across seven European coun-
tries, Mohnen et al. (2006) observe that the effect of "proximity to basic research [is] 
quite sizeable in the high-tech sectors, much less so in the low-tech sectors" (Mohnen 
et al., 2006, p. 31). Although this observation is not their main result, it seems never-
theless to be consistent across countries and period, and other studies tend to corrobo-
rate it. Using data from the Dutch component of the 2
nd and 3
rd Community Innovation 
Surveys, Belderbos et al. (2004) provide evidence that cooperation with universities 
boosts the sales of new or significantly improved products. In line with this, Nieto and 
Santamaria (2007) find that technological cooperation networks are crucial in achieving 
a higher degree of novelty in product development. 
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In this paper, we examine the impact of cooperation with public research on firms' suc-
cess in innovation, using the most recent ‘complete' wave of the Community Innovation 
Survey1, and adding three new contributions to the literature. First, we adopt an 
econometric methodology that addresses both self-selection and endogeneity issues in 
the innovation function. This was left out of the focus of previous studies. Second, we 
extend our analysis to process innovation, whereas most of the previous studies fo-
cused on product innovation only. Third, we explicitly follow an international compari-
son approach. We concentrate on two countries, France and Germany, which allows 
us not only to compare our econometric results, but also to examine in some depth the 
conditions of firms' cooperation with science in each country. 
2.2  Institutional background: the French and German 
technology transfer systems  
A comparison between France and Germany is both extremely relevant and very in-
formative to anyone interested in studying university-industry relationships in the Euro-
pean context. Historically, both countries are among the founding members of the 
European Union (EU). As far as European countries are concerned, France and Ger-
many are large-scale economies, which have kept for many years a leading position 
but are now facing similar difficulties (e.g., relative slowdown in economic growth, lin-
gering unemployment, etc.). They are also (together with Italy and the U.K.) among the 
four European countries whose investments in R&D are the highest in absolute terms 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
France and Germany also share similarities in their intellectual tradition, which has 
been instrumental in shaping their academic systems. Even today the French and 
German academic systems still differ in a number of ways from the international stan-
dards set by the New Public Management paradigm, as applied in North American and 
British universities. For instance, in France, academic careers are not driven by the "up 
or out" model that prevails in most universities worldwide. Tenure occurs at a very early 
stage, and the "publish or perish" rule is therefore far less drastic than in other coun-
tries (although publications play a key role at different stages in the career). And al-
though Germany is gradually adopting the international standard, academic careers are 
                                                  
1  We use CIS4, which covers the years 2002-2004. At the time of this writing, CIS5 (2006-
2008) is not available for research yet, while the ‘intermediary’ CIS covering 2004-2006 has 
only a very limited scope (in France, for instance, it only samples manufacturing firms and 
foregoes some of the usual questions). 
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still largely shaped by the traditional system of academic self-governance and strong 
State regulations (compare Schubert, 2009). 
In France as well as in Germany, public research institutions include both universities 
and research institutes. In France, besides university laboratories, there are four public 
research institutes: (1)  the CNRS, which conducts basic research in most scientific 
disciplines, (2) the INRA, which focuses on life sciences and their agronomic applica-
tions, (3)  the INRIA, dedicated to applied computer sciences, and (4)  the INSERM, 
which is concerned by medical research and public health. These four institutes all 
have headquarters located in the capital, and research centres spread all over the na-
tional territory. These research centres either function as autonomous, standalone 
units, or are integrated within universities. Even in the latter case, researchers in the 
public institutes are evaluated on the basis of their academic publications only and 
have no teaching obligation. 
Two other public institutions, the CEA and the Institut Pasteur, must also be mentioned, 
if only because (together with the CNRS) they represent 90% of the income generated 
from intellectual property rights in the French public sector (IGF, 2007). The CEA, 
whose initial mission was to develop the French nuclear program, now conducts basic 
and applied research in several disciplines, from quantum physics to molecular biology. 
The research conducted at the CEA is generally related, even if only remotely or indi-
rectly, to nuclear research. The Institut Pasteur is focusing on biological and medical 
research, with therapeutic applications. The French public research system is com-
pleted by a number of smaller institutes, with more narrowly defined missions (research 
on environmental resources, marine research, etc.).  
In Germany, the public research system consists of (1) universities, (2) universities of 
applied sciences (Fachhochschulen), which are in majority run by the governments of 
the Länder, and (3) extra-university research. Most extra-university research institutes 
belong either to the Max Planck Society, the Helmholtz Association, the Fraunhofer 
Gesellschaft, or the Leibniz Society. Apart from these, there are other smaller insti-
tutes, either government-run or completely independent. Altogether, the extra-
university research institutes command budgets which account for one third of the 
German public science budget. As in France, the personnel doing research in extra-
university institutes have no teaching obligations. However, some of them do have ex-
plicit technology transfer missions. This is especially true for the Fraunhofer Gesell-
schaft with its about 17,000 employees and 60 research centres. These centres primar-
ily engage in applied research and development, a large part of which is conducted in 
collaboration with firms.  
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All these similarities between France and Germany suggest that university-industry 
relationships may have the same determinants, and may face the same difficulties in 
both countries. However, in spite of those similarities, Hagedoorn et al. (2000) empha-
sise some fundamental differences in the implementation of science policies in France 
and in Germany. In France, science and technology policies are more mission-
oriented2, where the missions are defined at the national level by a strongly centralized 
State. By contrast, in Germany, science and technology policies are more diffusion-
oriented, and are defined within a decentralized, federal political system where States 
(Länder) are given a very large degree of autonomy. In fact, the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (especially Article 70 and Articles 72 to 74) puts univer-
sity policy almost completely into the hands of the Länder. 
In France, the policy instruments designed to encourage knowledge transfers from 
public research institutions are comprised in the Act of Law of July 12
th, 1999 (a testi-
mony to the centralized, mission-oriented French approach to science policy). A sub-
stantial part of this Act is specifically dedicated to the cooperation between firms and 
public research. It allows universities and research institutes (CNRS, INRA, INRIA and 
INSERM) to create in-house knowledge and technology transfer offices. Their task is to 
manage research contracts with other organisations, and especially contracts with pri-
vate firms. In spite of this Act, research contracts still represent a very small fraction of 
public research funding: in 2007, the ratio of revenue from research contracts to total 
research expenditures was equal to 2% on average in CNRS and universities, although 
it could rise to 6% in some universities (IGF, 2007). 
In the recent period, a number of instruments were added to the Act of Law of July 12
th, 
1999. Since 2006, the National Research Agency (ANR) can bring financial support to 
collaborative research projects between public research institutions and private firms. 
This support targets specific fields of research with a comparatively low private R&D 
effort, and considered as strategic by the French government, such as nanotechnolo-
gies. The government has also created clusters (known as pôles de compétitivité) in 
order to foster scientific collaborations at the regional level. These clusters regroup in a 
same area universities, research institutes and private firms, generally around a com-
mon topic or research field. In order to give firms an incentive to cooperate, the gov-
ernment offers tax credits to those that settle down in these areas. In addition, a decen-
                                                  
2  For instance, cooperating with public institutions and private firms is defined in France as 
the "Third Mission of the University", the first two being teaching and doing academic re-
search. 
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tralized organisation (OSEO) was created in 2005 (through a merger of existing institu-
tions), in order to help SMEs collaborate with public research labs at the regional 
level3. Note, however, that these additional instruments did not exist during the period 
of analysis considered in the present paper (2002-2004). 
In Germany, knowledge and technology transfers (KTT) have been a central concern 
for the German federal government since the 1980s. German governments have fol-
lowed a three-dimensional approach to the promotion of KTT. These three dimensions 
are: (1)  reducing the costs of KTT, (2)  increasing the incentives of universities and 
other research institutions to engage in KTT, and (3) increasing the incentives of enter-
prises to engage in KTT. In Germany, however, science (and especially university) 
policy is generally a competency of the local States (the Länder). Since this also in-
cludes policies related to KTT, the result is that policy measures are widely scattered. 
Therefore, giving more than short examples of the aforementioned three dimensions 
would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
As an example of the first dimension, technology transfer offices (Technologietransfer-
stelle) form a widespread policy instrument, common to all Länder. Technology transfer 
offices are considered as a key element for a successful KTT policy, since they should 
help reducing the high costs associated with the search for partners. Many German 
universities thus have their own technology transfer offices. Their task is to establish 
and reinforce contacts between university labs on the one hand, and private firms on 
the other. However, their effectiveness is often constrained by a chronic lack of man-
power. Indeed, a technology transfer office often consists of only two or three employ-
ees, with a variable amount of work experience. 
Until recently, German universities could not keep the surpluses generated by research 
contracts with private firms. This gave them little incentive to engage in KTT. Recent 
policy changes, following the second of the above-mentioned dimensions, have altered 
that situation in many Länder. These Länder now allow universities to keep the finan-
cial surpluses of their research contracts, and to use them for their own purposes (such 
as purchasing equipment or hiring temporary personnel). In addition to these meas-
ures, the federal government has recently launched the "Research Bonus", which can 
be seen as an example of both the second and third dimensions. It is a temporary pol-
icy measure, which aims at giving additional incentives to cooperate to both universities 
                                                  
3  The scope of OSEO’s action has been enlarged in 2008, when it incorporated the Agency 
for Industrial Innovation (AII), which has a similar mission but targets large firms. 
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and firms (and in particular to SMEs). Organisations wishing to start a collaborative 
research project may apply for this bonus, which is added to the proposed value of the 
contract, and can be shared between the firm and the public research institution. If the 
bonus is granted (which only occurs if the research proposal passes an external review 
process), it can amount to up to 25% of the value of the contract, with an upper bound 
of 100,000 euros. 
To put it in a nutshell, our examination reveals two inverse trends. In Germany, 
strengthening partnerships between industry and science has traditionally been the 
task of the regional governments (the Länder). However, the recent creation of the 
"Research Bonus" may illustrate the need for a stronger – even if temporary – involve-
ment of the federal government. In France, over the last decade, the central govern-
ment has expressed its willingness to encourage public-private research partnerships. 
However, the need to give more autonomy to the local and regional actors of innova-
tion has gradually emerged. As an answer to this need, the French government has 
created clusters and the decentralized agency OSEO. Time alone will tell if these poli-
cies measures have been fruitful. Meanwhile, we can expect, from these observations, 
that the returns to public-private research collaborations may be quite different in 
France and in Germany. 
2.3  Data sources: CIS4 data for France and Germany 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data from the French and German CIS4, 
which cover the years 2002-2004. The CIS is a harmonised survey conducted in every 
EU Member State by the national statistical agency, under the coordination of Eurostat. 
It consists of two parts: (1) a core questionnaire common to all EU countries, and (2) a 
complementary questionnaire, the contents of which can vary across countries. The 
core questionnaire gives firm-level information on innovative activities, including R&D, 
product and process innovations, innovation protection, and abandoned innovations. It 
also contains information on the environment of the innovation process (such as mar-
ket conditions, public subsidies, and hampering factors), as well as firm specific details 
such as size and turnover. The complementary questionnaire provides additional in-
formation on specific topics, defined at the national level. These topics may vary across 
countries, according to their degree of importance in the eye of each national govern-
ment. 
By its very nature, the CIS lends itself well to international comparisons. The CIS4 sur-
vey provides in each EU country a representative sample of manufacturing and ser-
vices firms with 20 employees or more. However, in spite of the large degree of har-
monisation of the CIS, two difficulties in comparing France and Germany remain. The 
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first concerns the status of the survey: it is mandatory in France (firms that refuse to 
answer have to pay a fine), but not in Germany. This entails a much lower response 
rate in the latter country. The CIS4 survey obtained a response rate of about 80% in 
France, yielding a sample size of 20,672 firms, and a response rate of about 20% in 
Germany, yielding a sample of 5,200 firms. Because of the smaller size of the German 
sample, it is difficult to make international comparisons on a specific industry or group 
of industries (e.g., high-tech industries). Our comparative analysis will therefore con-
cern the whole sample in each country, and we will control for inter-industry heteroge-
neity by including industry fixed-effects in the econometric models. 
A second difficulty is that the German CIS4 contains additional questions which are 
neither part of the harmonised survey, nor included in the French complementary sur-
vey. These questions provide variables that may be interesting for our analysis (e.g. 
variables describing market structure). We tried to find reasonable substitutes for these 
variables in the French survey, but this was not always possible. To overcome this dif-
ficulty, we had to allow for some flexibility in the specification of the econometric model. 
This means we will rely, as far as possible, on variables that are common to both sur-
veys. But we will also include, in the model estimated on the German data, variables 
that are not available in the French data. 
3  Conceptual framework and econometric modelling 
3.1  The conceptual framework of the innovation produc-
tion function  
The concept of a production function is essential to economic theory. It is usually ap-
plied to production processes that result in marketable goods or services. A production 
function is simply a functional relationship defining a mathematical mapping of the input 
space into the output space. Although the distinction between innovation inputs and 
innovation output goes further back in time, Griliches (1979) was among the first to 
propose a formal representation of the so-called "knowledge production function"4. In 
Griliches (1979)'s conceptual framework, knowledge actually appears both as an input 
(in the usual production function), and as the output of a specific production process: 
                                                  
4  See also Kohn and Scott (1982) for the inclusion of a formal "R&D production function" in a 
theoretical framework. 
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the knowledge production process, which can be seen as a more general representa-
tion of the innovation process. 
Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) focus on the latter, and explain how it can be repre-
sented using an "innovation production function", linking innovation outputs to innova-
tion inputs (some of them being control variables rather than direct inputs). Unfortu-
nately, the mere statement of the existence of an innovation production function gives 
little guidance on what it may look like. Leaving aside the problem of the specification 
of a functional form, once an indicator for innovative performance or innovation output 
has been chosen, the hardest task is to find the relevant input and control variables. 
This requires a solid understanding of innovation processes occurring within firms. 
Since Schumpeter (1934), many branches of the economic literature have given valu-
able ideas on this topic. Most notably, the determinants of the innovation process may 
be divided into external and internal factors (external and internal being defined here 
with respect to the boundaries of the firm).  
The most prominent external factors are certainly market structure (Schumpeter, 1934, 
1943; Scherer, 1965; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) and technological opportunities 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Crépon et al., 1998). The latter definitely should, ceteris paribus, 
raise innovative performance, because the costs of discovering knowledge should de-
crease with larger technological opportunities, while the pay-offs should increase. The 
direction of the influence of the market structure is an oft-discussed topic. There is not 
much agreement in the literature, regarding whether innovation is higher in a monopo-
listic, oligopolistic or competitive market – although firm-level studies (e.g., Baldwin et 
al., 2002; Schubert, 2010) often find that a moderate amount of competition is associ-
ated with a higher degree of innovation. In any case, no matter how heterogeneous the 
opinions on the direction of its effect, almost all studies agree that market structure is a 
decisive factor. 
Among internal factors, the most prominent is firm size, presented as a key determi-
nant of innovation since Schumpeter (1934). The relationship between innovation and 
firm size has been the object of a large body of empirical literature, which often uses 
R&D as a proxy for innovation. Kohn and Scott (1982) propose a theoretical justifica-
tion of why a test of the relationship between firm size and an innovation input such as 
R&D is a good proxy for a test of the relationship between firm size and innovation out-
put. Whether they use R&D or an output measure, most empirical studies (e.g., 
Scherer, 1965; Link 1981; Acs and Audretsch 1987; Cohen et al. 1987; Cohen and 
Klepper 1996a, b; Chang and Robin, 2006) find an inverted-u relationship between firm 
size and innovation. It must be noted, however, that studies using CIS-type data (e.g., 
Baldwin, 2002; Griffith et al., 2006) sometimes find that innovation output strictly in-
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creases with firm size. Again, whatever the exact nature of the relationship, firm size is 
definitely a factor that must be accounted for when estimating the innovation production 
function. 
The other internal factors liable to affect innovative performance can be summed up as 
the ‘resources' of a firm. In this sense, the generic term ‘resources' include, among 
others, human capital, management capabilities and financial resources (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Increasing the quality of any of these resources should lead to 
a larger innovation output, especially if they are explicitly dedicated to the innovation 
process. Indeed, innovation output is not the mere by-product of the usual production 
process, but results from an intentional activity. Therefore, some of the aforementioned 
resources should be used as direct innovation inputs. The amount (and quality) of re-
sources devoted to innovation may increase a firm's chances to find technological op-
portunities. But finding technological opportunities also depends on how efficient the 
search process is. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) actually understood a firm's innovation process as a search 
process where some degree of mistake would be inevitable. The quality of this search 
process clearly reflects a form of resource or capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2001), 
since ‘quality' here means nothing more than seeking out a technological opportunity 
and correctly predicting its commercial relevance. The broader this strategy is, the 
more technological opportunities will be discovered and the more precisely the pro-
spective value will be predicted (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; March, 1991; 
Katila, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2004). In this context, collaboration with science (the 
effect of which is at the core of this paper) can be understood as a special way of en-
gaging in the search process. Indeed, science commands valuable and additional 
knowledge resources, in which firms usually cannot readily tap. 
The above arguments are schematically summarised in Figure 1, where the arrows 
primarily have an expository meaning. They do not reflect a complete model of the in-
novation process: to do so, many of them should be bidirectional. For instance, in Fig-
ure 1, size influences innovation performance. But a higher innovation performance 
may in turn help a firm grow, i.e. increase in size. The model depicted in Figure 1 could 
also be completed with additional arrows. For instance, one could place an arrow be-
tween cooperation with science and R&D, to take into account a firm's absorptive ca-
pacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990): leading firms also do R&D because it gives 
them the capacity to absorb new scientific knowledge. The innovation production func-
tion approach does not capture all of the relationships depicted (or potentially depicted) 
in Figure 1. However, it does capture key elements of Figure 1, and in this respect may 
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be a powerful tool to help us answer the question of how cooperation with science af-
fects firms innovation output. 
Figure 1:  A schematic overview on factors affecting the process of firm inno-
vation 
 
Source: Authors' own representation. 
3.2  Econometric modelling 
3.2.1  Estimation strategy and model specification 
The aim of our econometric analysis is to estimate the impact of cooperation between 
public research institutions and private firms on the latter's innovation activities. To do 
so, we follow the innovation production function approach described in Section 3.1, 
adopting and extending the framework proposed by Mairesse and Mohnen (2002). 
Since non-responses to innovation-related questions in the CIS are unlikely to be ran-
dom, these authors specify the innovation production function as a two-equation Gen-
eralized Tobit model. The first equation (selection equation) explains the propensity to 
innovate and the second equation (intensity equation) explains the intensity of innova-
tion activities within the firm.  
In the selection equation, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm has 
done product innovation over a period of reference. In the intensity equation, the de-
pendent variable is a measure of the share of sales due to new or innovative products. 
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The latter equation includes a measure of proximity to basic research, which has a sig-
nificantly positive impact on innovation intensity5.  
Due to the filtering methodology of CIS that guides non-innovators around questions 
that provide details about its innovation activities, the intensity equation can only be 
estimated for firms that have indicated that they innovate. It can be shown that it is im-
possible (except for pathological cases) to estimate consistently the intensity equation 
without looking at the selection equation. 
However, because Mairesse's and Mohnen's main purpose is elsewhere, they do not 
take into account the fact that proximity to science on the one hand, and innovation 
intensity on the other, may be determined by common (unobserved) variables. This can 
occur because cooperating with public research institutions makes more sense for 
companies actively engaged in innovation. In econometric terms, this means that prox-
imity to science could be an endogenous explanatory variable in Mairesse and Mohnen 
(2002)'s model. In an content-related perspective not controlling for endogeneity finding 
a positive "effect" of collaborations with science on the innovation intensity (e.g. turn-
over with new products) is indicative of situation where otherwise innovative firms sim-
ply choose to innovate with universities. It does not ensure any kind of causality in the 
sense that the collaboration has made the firm more innovative. To find out whether 
there is any causal effect, we have to take possible endogeneity into account. 
Since, in the present paper, the focus is on the effect of cooperation with public re-
search, we extend Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)'s framework in two directions. First, in 
addition to controlling for selectivity into innovation, we account for the potential en-
dogeneity of cooperation with science. Second, we extend the analysis to process in-
novation. The first extension leads us to estimate a Heckit model with endogenous ex-
planatory variables (rather than a Generalized Tobit model with all explanatory vari-
ables treated as exogenous). We first apply this model to product innovation, and then 
apply it to process innovation, experimenting with different proxies to depict the latter.  
The Heckit model with endogenous explanatory variables is an extension of the 
Heckman procedure, accounting for the potential endogeneity of some of the explana-
                                                  
5  This result is not mentioned in the core of Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)’s paper, but can 
be observed in the Appendix mentioned in Footnote 8 on page 228. It has been confirmed 
in discussions with the authors, and also appears in Mohnen et al. (2006), who apply a 
similar model to the same dataset. 
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tory variables. It can be specified as a three-equation model, which, following 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 567), we can write as follows:  
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where the δ's and α1 are parameters to be estimated and where the ui's are random 
errors. 
In Model (1), yi1 is the variable of interest (here a measure of innovation intensity in firm 
i) and yi2 a potentially endogenous explanatory variable (here an indicator of a coopera-
tion between firm i and a public research institution). The third equation, where 1(.) 
denotes the indicator function (equal to 1 if its argument is true, and to 0 otherwise), is 
the selection equation, as in the standard Heckman model. The role of this equation 
(generally specified as a Probit model) is to correct for the selection bias: in CIS4 non-
innovating firms do not have to provide answers on more detailed innovation-related 
questions (such as turnover with new products, patents, knowledge sources) and thus 
drop out, leaving only innovative firms to answer the relevant questions. If this selection 
is not random, it will induce estimation bias. It must therefore be taken into account in 
the econometric model. 
To estimate Model (1), we follow the standard three-step procedure described in 
Wooldridge (2002, 567-570). First, we obtain the predicted value of δ3 by estimating the 
selection equation (linking yi3 to z) on the whole sample. Second, we compute the in-
verse Mills ratio: 
(2)  ( ) 3 3 ˆ ˆ δ λ λ i i z =  
Third, we estimate, on the sub-sample of innovating firms, the following model: 
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which is specified as an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression and estimated by 2 
Stages Least Squares (2SLS). Given proper instruments, the effect of cooperation with 
public research, measured by α1, will be net of endogeneity and selection biases. That 
is controlling for selection, it can be interpreted as the causal effect of collaboration with 
science on innovativeness. 
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For confidentiality reasons, the access to each national CIS is restricted to researchers 
working in the relevant country. We thus had to conduct our estimations separately, in 
France and in Germany respectively. In what follows, we will therefore sometimes re-
fer, for the sake of convenience, to the "French model" or to the "German model". Nev-
ertheless, the reader should keep it mind that it is the basically the same econometric 
model, with a similar structure applied in both countries6. 
When the model is applied to product innovation, our measure of innovation intensity y1 
is the share of sales related to new products (or "share of innovative sales"), as in 
Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)7. When the model is applied to process innovation, we 
experiment with four alternative explained variables, which respectively measure: (1) 
the extent of unit cost reductions, (2) the extent of cost reductions in materials, (3) the 
increase in production flexibility, and (4) the increase in production capacity. All these 
variables are ordered categorical variables, but, in a first approximation, we treat them 
as continuous. In all applications of the model (i.e. for both product and process inno-
vation), our endogenous explanatory variable y2 is a binary variable indicating whether, 
between 2002 and 2004, firm i has cooperated with a university or another public re-
search institution. The z vector includes all other explanatory variables, i.e. the z1 vec-
tor of explanatory variables used in the intensity equation plus the exclusion variables 
used in the selection equation. The later variables are also used as instruments in 
Model (2), which is why z appears twice in Model (1). 
 
  
                                                  
6  The only differences come from the additional explanatory variables that were included 
when estimating the model on the German sample. As explained in 2.3, these variables are 
not available in the French sample. 
7  As in Mairesse and Mohnen (2002), we actually use the log-transform of this variable, ln[ y1 
/(1-y1)]. The reason is that the share of innovative sales is by definition a truncated variable 
that is always positive. This may bias the regression, whereas the log-transform is allowed 
to vary from -∞ to +∞. 
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Table 1.a:  Summary statistics 
  France  Germany 
  Mean  (Std Dev).  Mean  (Std Dev.) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:         
Number of employees  287.79  (1945.60)  545.46  (5744.92) 
Sales to 3 main customers (as % of 
total sales) 
—  40.82  (28.43) 
Obstacles to innovation linked to 
competition (yes/no) 
0.14  (0.35)  — 
Obstacles to innovation linked to 
demand (yes/no) 
0.15  (0.35)  — 
Importance of quality competition
 (a)  —  2.00  (1.03) 
Importance of price competition
(a)  —  1.85  (1.12) 
Relative size of main competitors
(b)  —  2.29  (1.23) 
Suppliers as source of information
(c)  0.23  (0.42)  1.18  (1.07) 
Customers as source of information
(c)  0.23  (0.42)  1.45  (1.23) 
Group as source of information
(c)  0.15  (0.36)  1.66  (1.30) 
Competitors as source of informa-
tion
(c) 
0.37  (0.48)  1.05  (1.01) 
Industry (coded using OECD techno-
logical levels): 
       
  Manufacturing – high technologi-
cal intensity 
0.03  (0.16)  0.09  (0.08) 
 Manufacturing  –  high/medium 
tech. 
0.09  (0.29)  0.15  (0.36) 
  Manufacturing – medium/low tech. 0.08  (0.28)  0.15  (0.36) 
  Manufacturing – low technological 
intensity 
0.16  (0.37)  0.13  (0.34) 
  Knowledge intensive businesses 
and services  
0.23  (0.42)  0.26  (0.44) 
 Other  services  0.41  (0.49)  0.21  (0.41) 
Innovation expenditures in Euros  1906.98  (36927.09)  11084.63  (217167.00) 
East Germany (yes/no)  —  0.33  (0.47) 
Part of a group (yes/no)  0.56  (0.50)  0.59  (0.49) 
ENDOGENOUS EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLE: 
       
Cooperation with public research 
institutions (yes/no) 
0.07  (0.26)  0.06  (0.25) 
EXCLUSION 
VARIABLES/INSTRUMENTS: 
       
Firm uses secrecy to protect innova-
tion (yes/no) 
0.14  (0.35)  0.38  (0.49) 
Total profit in 2003 in Euros  —  1007.58  (9430.51) 
Total sales in 2002 in Euros  64005.89  (553248.00)  — 
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  France  Germany 
  Mean  (Std Dev).  Mean  (Std Dev.) 
Lack technological know-how to inno-
vate
(c) 
0.04  (0.19)  0.93  (0.92) 
Lack of skilled personnel to inno-
vate
(c) 
0.12  (0.32)  0.67  (0.74) 
Costs of innovation too high
(c)  0.20  (0.40)  1.66  (1.13) 
Lack of partners to innovate
(c)  0.07  (0.26)  0.73  (0.87) 
Number of CRITT in the region  7.19  (3.64)  — 
CRITT covering several industries   0.69  (0.46)  — 
Universities / 1000 km²  —  1.58  (3.17) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
Firm introduced a product innovation 
(yes/no) 
0.27  (0.44)  0.52  (0.50) 
% of total sales due to new  products  0.06  (0.17)  17.55  (25.25) 
Proxy for process #1: Extent of unit 
cost reduction  
1.78  (1.16)  0.89  (1.01) 
Proxy for process #2: Extent of cost 
reduction in materials 
1.25  (1.11)  0.72  (0.92) 
Proxy for process #3: Increase in 
production flexibility 
1.68  (1.14)  1.21  (1.14) 
Proxy for process #4: Increase in 
production capacity 
1.68  (1.14)  1.00  (1.07) 
(a) Measured on a Likkert scale from 1 (most important) to 6 (least important). 
(b) Measured on a Likkert scale from 1 (largest) to 4 (smallest). 
(c) For France, indicator equal to 1 if medium/high importance and to 0 otherwise; for Germany, 
measured on Likkert scale from 0 (no importance) to 3 (high importance). 
In accordance with the discussion summarised in Figure 1, the z1 vector includes the 
following explanatory variables: the log of firm size (measured by the number of em-
ployees), indicators of demand-size constraints on the firm's output market, indicators 
of various sources of information used to innovate, industry dummies, innovation ex-
penditures8 per employee, and a variable indicating whether a firm is part of a group. 
In the German model, z1 also includes additional variables which describe a firm's de-
gree of diversification, market shares, and whether a firm is located in West or East 
Germany. Diversification is represented by the share of sales to the three main cus-
tomers of a firm, while market shares are measured by the relative size of the main 
competitors of a firm. As was said above, we do not have equivalent variables in the 
French component of CIS4. Note, that, for a similar reason, demand constraints are 
                                                  
8  I.e. R&D expenditures plus expenditures on other innovation inputs. 
 Conceptual framework and econometric modelling  17 
represented by different variables in the French and German models: in the German 
model, we use indicators of the relative importance of price competition and quality 
competition. Lacking similar indicators in the French survey, we replace them in the 
French model by two indicators of "hampering factors", the first indicating obstacles 
linked to competition and the second obstacles related to an insufficient demand. 
In both models, the variables describing the sources of information used in the innova-
tion process can be interpreted as indicators of the openness of the firm, in the sense 
of Laursen and Salter (2006). As explained in 3.1, innovation is a process in which a 
firm must seek the relevant internal and external resources to innovate. Laursen and 
Salter (2004, 2006) suggest that more ‘open' firms might not only be more innovative, 
but also more prone to cooperate with universities. Finally, our industry dummies 
should allows us to capture technological opportunities, as emphasised by Mairesse 
and Mohnen (2002). For this reason, we have recoded the 2-digit industry codes 
(NACE codes) available in CIS4 into the "technological levels" classification proposed 
by the OECD. The different categories used in this classification are presented in Table 
1.a. 
Our exclusion variables (i.e. those included in z, but excluded from z1) are an indicator 
of the use of secrecy as a mean to protect inventions, a measure of past profits (for 
Germany) or past sales (for France), as well as indicators of factors liable to hamper 
the innovation process. These factors include high innovation costs, lack of technologi-
cal knowledge, lack of qualified personnel, and lack of innovation partners. We add to 
our list of exclusion variables regional indicators acquired from external statistical 
sources. The rationale for the choice of these indicators will be explained in Section 
3.2.2.  
Table 1.a gives summary statistics for the explanatory and exclusion variables in the 
French and German samples. Table 1.b presents the distribution of the key explanatory 
variable (our potentially endogenous indicator of cooperation with public research), by 
industry and with respect to firm size. Both distributions appear to be quite similar in 
France and in Germany: the proportion of collaborations with public research institu-
tions is more important among large firms and in high-tech industries. 
 
  
 18 Conceptual  framework  and econometric modelling 
Table 1.b:  Proportion of firms cooperating with public research institutions (by 
industry and by size) 
  France  Germany 
  Mean  Std Dev.  Mean  Std Dev. 
INDUSTRY (OECD technological levels):         
Manufacturing – High technological intensity  0.10  0.30  0.12  0.32 
Manufacturing – High/Medium tech.  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.29 
Manufacturing – Medium/Low tech.  0.04  0.20  0.06  0.23 
Manufacturing – Low technological intensity  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.14 
Knowledge intensive businesses and ser-
vices 
0.03  0.18  0.06  0.23 
Other services  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.13 
FIRM SIZE:         
49 employees or less  0.01  0.12  0.03  0.18 
50-99 employees   0.04  0.19  0.04  0.21 
100-249 employees  0.06  0.23  0.04  0.19 
250-499 employees  0.11  0.31  0.06  0.24 
500 employees or more  0.21  0.41  0.15  0.36 
Example: in France, in high technology industries, the proportion of firms that have cooperated 
with a university or public research institution between 2002 and 2004 is 0.10. In other words, 
10% of firms operating in high technology industries have cooperated with public research insti-
tutions. 
3.2.2  Choice of instruments 
As was said above, we suspect our indicator of cooperation with public research may 
be endogenous. The econometric model presented in 3.2.1 account for a potential en-
dogeneity bias by combining a standard Heckman procedure with an IV approach. In 
this model, the exclusion variables used in the selection equation are also used as in-
struments in the IV regression. By definition, in our model, good instruments are vari-
ables which are likely to be correlated with cooperation, without having a direct effect 
on innovation intensity. Finding good instruments is never an easy task, and our appli-
cation is no exception to this rule. Since their quality is crucial for an unbiased estima-
tion of our model, our choice of instruments deserves to be discussed more exten-
sively. To find instrument candidates in the CIS4 samples, we first tried to identify vari-
ables that may give public research institutions an incentive (or disincentive) to cooper-
ate with a firm. We then tried to ensure that these variables were not necessarily di-
rectly correlated with a firm's innovation intensity. 
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Let us first consider the role of firms' financial resources as an instrument candidate. 
Accessing additional financial resources is a strong incentive to cooperate for public 
research institutions. Therefore, a firm having a large amount of financial resources will 
be more likely to attract academic partners. We thus include in our list of instruments a 
measure of firms' past financial resources. This measure is the value of total profits 
observed in 2003 for Germany, and the value of total sales observed in 2002 for 
France (as total profits are not available in the French CIS4 sample). This choice of 
variable as an instrument candidate is justified by the fact that high financial resources 
in the past do not necessarily entail more innovation in the current period. 
However, public research institutions have sources of motivations that go beyond the 
sole financial incentives. These institutions (and researchers themselves) are primarily 
interested in publishing new and interesting results in international scientific journals, 
because this is the usual way to maintain their scientific reputation and academic visi-
bility. Research institutions may therefore be reluctant to start partnerships or coopera-
tive agreements with firms that rely on secrecy to protect their inventions. Secrecy as-
sociated to a research project might mean fewer opportunities to publish in good scien-
tific journals. From the viewpoint of the firm, secrecy is not systematically associated to 
a lower innovation intensity, which makes an indicator of secrecy a good candidate for 
an instrument. The CIS4 samples explicitly provide such an indicator, which we in-
cluded in our list of instruments. 
Finally, our list of instruments includes four indicators, already presented in 3.2.1, of 
obstacles that may hamper innovation. Three of them (lack of technological know-how, 
lack of qualified personnel, and lack of partners to innovate with) correspond to difficul-
ties that may be overcome through cooperation with a public research institution. 
These three variables may then be associated with a higher probability to cooperate. 
By contrast, the indicator of high innovation costs could be associated with a lower 
propensity to cooperate, because cooperation induces additional costs for a firm. 
These four indicators are quite likely to be correlated with the probability to cooperate. 
We cannot say that they are always associated with less innovation: sometimes the 
most innovative firms report high difficulties to innovate, since innovating becomes 
more difficult when they get closer to the technological frontier. This qualifies our four 
indicators as instruments candidates, although they may well be weak instruments: 
they still might be correlated with innovation intensity. 
Whether all the variables described above are truly valid instruments remains a debat-
able issue, as in any study relying on a similar methodology. A first element pleading 
for these variables is that, compared to the main determinants of innovation reviewed 
in Section 3.1, their direct effect on innovation intensity is presumably inexistent or neg-
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ligible. We also tested for the empirical relevance of these instruments candidates. Al-
though the tests9 were reassuring regarding the validity of the instruments listed 
above, we felt compelled to scan other statistical sources for additional candidates, in 
order to enrich our list of instruments and to be able to test for alternative specifica-
tions, if need be. 
This led us to regional indicators describing the opportunities for cooperation in re-
search offered by the region or area where a firm is located. In addition to being readily 
available, these variables are good potential instruments. Indeed, a firm located in a 
region with higher cooperation opportunities will be more likely (everything else being 
equal) to develop research partnerships with public institutions. However, the existence 
of cooperation opportunities at the regional level is unlikely to have a direct impact on 
the innovation intensity of a specific firm. 
In France, we used the list of the Regional Centres for Innovation and Technology 
Transfer (hereafter denoted by the French acronym CRITT) to build two measures of 
regional opportunities for cooperation with public research10. A CRITT is a public cen-
tre whose task is to provide firms with R&D services. To do so, it is backed by a public 
research institution such as a university or a public research laboratory. A CRITT is 
generally associated with a specific industry or market, but can also propose services 
across a wider scope of industries. The list of CRITT is available online. It is published 
by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research11. Our first measure based on this 
list is the number of CRITT in the region where a firm is located. The second measure 
is a binary variable which indicates whether there exists, in this region, a CRITT whose 
activities cover several industries. These regional indicators were easily matched to the 
CIS4 data, since the latter informs us of the region where each surveyed firm is lo-
cated, and of the industry in which it operates. 
In Germany, sources of regional indicators were harder to come by. However, we were 
able to retain one variable: the number of universities per thousand of square kilome-
tres. This variable is observed for each Land (there is a total of 16 Länder in Germany). 
Since the German CIS4 informs us about the Land in which a firm is located, adding 
                                                  
9  In Section 4, we detail and comment upon these tests, implemented on our full list of in-
struments. 
10  The geographic level is that of the 26 administrative regions of France (both mainland and 
overseas). 
11 http://wwww.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/technologie/critt/index.htm  
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this variable to the CIS4 data was quite straightforward. Even though the German Land 
is a more aggregated geographic level than the French administrative region, the num-
ber of universities per thousand of square kilometres is a good proxy variable for coop-
eration opportunities at a regional level. Table 1.a provides summary statistics for our 
various indicators of regional cooperation opportunities (which are featured at the end 
of the list of exclusion variables). 
4 Results 
4.1  Product innovation 
4.1.1  Detailed discussion of the Heckit estimates 
Since the model we estimate for product innovation builds on Mohnen and Mairesse 
(2002)'s seminal framework, it deserves to be commented in detail (if only for the sake 
of comparison). To start with, we briefly comment the estimates of the Probit model, 
used to specified the selection equation in Model (1). We then thoroughly discuss our 
main results, obtained by estimating Model (2)12. 
The results of the selection equation (which models the probability to be a product in-
novator) are presented in Table 2. This table shows that, in France as in Germany, the 
Schumpeterian determinants of innovation (firm size and market structure) play an im-
portant role. A larger size (as measured by the log of the number of employees) is as-
sociated with a higher probability to introduce a new product on the market. In Ger-
many, market power has a significant impact: a smaller market share (as measured by 
a larger relative size, in terms of sales, of the main competitors) is associated with a 
lower probability to innovate. It is all the more unfortunate that we miss a similar vari-
able in the French CIS. We also find, in both countries, that a higher level of innovation 
expenditures (per employee) is associated with a higher probability to innovate. This 
result is consistent with the framework of an "innovation production function", in which 
the main inputs are innovation expenditures (which mostly, but not exclusively, com-
prise R&D expenditures). 
                                                  
12  Model (1) and Model (2) refer to the general multi-equation models presented in Section 
3.2.1. 
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Table 2:  Endogenous Heckit procedure: selection equation (probability to be a  
product innovator) 
  France  Germany 
  Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Constant term  -1.75  (0.09)***  -2.14  (0.19)*** 
FIRM SIZE (Log-number of employees)  0.06  (0.01)***  0.06  (0.02)*** 
DIVERSIFICATION         
Turnover w/ 3 main customers  —  0.13  (0.03)*
** 
DEMAND         
Obstacles to innovation due to competition  0.03  (0.04)  — 
Obstacles to innovation due to demand  0.15  (0.04)***  — 
Importance of quality competition  —  -0.03  (0.03) 
Importance of price competition  —  0.08  (0.03)*** 
MARKET SHARE         
Relative size of main competitors  —  -0.05  (0.03)** 
OPENNESS OF THE COMPANY         
Suppliers as source of information  0.17  (0.03)***  -0.01  (0.03) 
Customers as source of information  0.71  (0.03)***  0.34  (0.04)*** 
Group as source of information  1.61  (0.03)***  0.44  (0.03)*** 
Competitors as source of information  0.23  (0.04)***  0.07  (0.02)** 
INDUSTRY (ref.: Hi-Tech Manufacturing)         
Hi-/Med-Tech Manufacturing  -0.15  (0.08)*  0.07  (0.12) 
Med-/Low-Tech Manufacturing  -0.35  (0.09)***  -0.31  (0.12)*** 
Low-Tech Manufacturing  -0.38  (0.08)***  -0.23  (0.12)* 
Knowledge Intensive Businesses and Services  -0.42  (0.08)***  -0.15  (0.11) 
Other Services  -0.83  (0.08)***  -0.41  (0.12)*** 
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS         
Innovation expenditures per employee  0.00  (0.00)***  2.41  (0.72)*** 
Company is part of a group  0.06  (0.03)**  0.01  (0.06) 
Eastern Germany  —  -0.02  (0.06) 
EXCLUSION VARIABLES         
Use of secrecy  0.40  (0.03)***  0.44  (0.06)*** 
Total sales in 2002  0.00  (0.00)  — 
Total profit in 2003  —  -0.00  (0.00) 
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  France  Germany 
  Coefficient Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Costs of innovation too high  0.01  (0.03)  -0.02  (0.03) 
Lack of technological know-how   -0.09  (0.07)  0.02  (0.05) 
Lack of skilled personnel  0.07  (0.04)  0.02  (0.04) 
Lack of partners to innovate  0.06  (0.05)  0.00  (0.04) 
Number of universities / 1000 km²  —  0.02  (0.01)** 
Number of CRITT in the region  0.00  (0.00)  — 
CRITT covering several industries  -0.02  (0.03)  — 
Models estimated by Maximum Likelihood.  
The LR test for global fit is significant at the 1% level in each country. 
Significant at the: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
Table 2 provides other interesting results. Thus, in France as in Germany, most of the 
variables measuring the openness of a firm are associated with a higher probability to 
be a product innovator. These results confirm those obtained by Laursen and Salter 
(2006) on UK data, and emphasize the increasing importance of "openness" in the in-
novation process. By contrast, industry effects differ significantly across countries. In 
France, the probability to innovate is highest in the high-technology manufacturing in-
dustries: in all other industries, the probability is always significantly lower than in this 
industry of reference. In Germany, high-technology manufacturing is not the only indus-
try to be associated with a high propensity to innovate: this propensity is as high in the 
High/Medium-technology manufacturing industries and in the knowledge-intensive ser-
vices as it is in our industry of reference. Finally, at this stage of the Heckit procedure, 
only one exclusion variable is significant in both countries. This variable, the use of 
secrecy as a mean to protect inventions, is associated with a higher probability to be a 
product innovator. The added regional indicator(s) of cooperation opportunities are only 
significant in the German model. 
We now turn to the discussion of the results obtained in the final stage of the Heckit 
procedure – denoted by Model (2) in Section 3.2.1. Model (2) is a system of two equa-
tions estimated by 2SLS. In other words, estimating Model (2) consists in running an IV 
regression, using the exclusion variables of the Probit model as instruments. The re-
sults of this IV regression are presented in Table 3.a. In this table, Column (I) gives the 
estimates of the first equation (the linear probability model explaining cooperation with 
a public research institution) and column (II) those of the second equation (explaining 
innovation intensity). 
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Table 3.a:  Endogenous Heckit procedure for product innovation: IV regression 
  (I) Cooperation w/ research  (II) Innovation intensity
(1) 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 




0.05  (0.00)***  0.03  (0.01)***  -0.17  (0.02)***  -0.18  (0.04)*** 
DIVERSIFICATION                 
Turnover w/ 3 main 
customers  —  -0.00  (0.01)  —  -0.30  (0.06)*** 
DEMAND                 
Obstacles to inno-
vation due to com-
petition 
0.03  (0.02)**  —  -0.04  (0.06)  — 
Obstacles to inno-
vation due to de-
mand 
0.02  (0.02)  —  -0.19  (0.06)***  — 
Importance of qual-
ity competition  —  -0.00 (0.01)  —  0.05  (0.04) 
Importance of price 
competition  —  0.02  (0.01)**  —  0.10  (0.04)** 
MARKET SHARE                 
Relative size of 
main competitors  —  -0.02 (0.01)**  —  -0.05  (0.04) 
OPENNESS OF THE 








0.07  (0.03)**  0.02  (0.02)  -0.06  (0.10)  -0.09  (0.11) 
Group as source of 




0.04  (0.01)***  0.01  (0.01)  0.07  (0.05)  0.06  (0.06) 
INDUSTRY
(2)                 
Hi-/Med-Tech 
Manufacturing  -0.04  (0.03)  0.01  (0.03)  -0.25  (0.10)**  -0.32  (0.16)** 
Med-/Low-Tech 
Manufacturing  -0.10  (0.03)***  -0.03 (0.03)  -0.46  (0.11)***  -0.38  (0.18)** 
Low-Tech Manu-
facturing  -0.17  (0.03)***  -0.07 (0.03)**  -0.45  (0.11)***  -0.19  (0.19) 
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  (I) Cooperation w/ research  (II) Innovation intensity
(1) 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Knowledge Inten-
sive Services  -0.09  (0.03)***  -0.01 (0.03)  -0.39  (0.10)***  -0.32  (0.15)** 
Other Services  -0.18  (0.04)***  -0.05 (0.04)  -0.46  (0.13)***  -0.49  (0.21)** 
OTHER 




0.00  (0.00)***  0.69  (0.15)***  0.00  (0.00)*  2.30  (0.90)** 
Company is part of 
a group  -0.04  (0.01)***  -0.01 (0.02)  0.04  (0.05)  -0.09  (0.11) 
Eastern Germany  —  0.05  (0.02)**  —  0.20  (0.11)* 
SELECTIVITY 
CORRECTION                 




        1.13  (0.28)***  2.13  (0.71)*** 
INSTRUMENTS                 
Use of secrecy  0.21  (0.02)***  0.13  (0.03)***         
Total sales in 2002  0.00  (0.00)**             
Total profit in 2003      0.00  (0.00)***         
Costs of innovation 
too high  0.04  (0.01)***  0.01  (0.01)*         
Lack of technologi-
cal know-how   -0.03  (0.03)  -0.01 (0.01)         
Lack of skilled per-
sonnel  -0.01  (0.02)  -0.00 (0.01)         
Lack of partners to 
innovate  0.07  (0.02)***  0.04  (0.01)***         
Number of univer-
sities / 1000 km²      0.00  (0.00)         
Number of CRITT 
in the region  0.00  (0.00)***             
CRITT covering 
several industries  -0.01  (0.01)             
(1) Dependent variable: logit transform of the % of turnover arising from new or improved prod-
ucts. 
(2) The reference category is "Manufacturing – High technological intensity". 
The Fisher test for the global fit of the IV regression is significant at the 1% level for both France 
and Germany. 
Significant at the: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
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Column (I) in Table 3.a shows that France and Germany share some common deter-
minants of the propensity to cooperate with public research. In both countries, this pro-
pensity increases with firm size, and with innovation expenditures per employee. Fur-
thermore, firms that are facing a stronger competition are also more likely to cooperate: 
obstacles to innovation due to competition (in France) and the importance of price 
competition (in Germany) are both associated with a higher probability to cooperate. 
We nevertheless observe two important differences. First, in France, firms operating in 
High-tech and High-/Medium-tech manufacturing industries have a significantly higher 
propensity to cooperate (the estimated parameters are significantly negative in all other 
categories of industry). By contrast, in Germany, the propensity to cooperate with a 
public research institution is not significantly different across sectors, except in Low-
tech manufacturing industries (where it is significantly lower). It seems, therefore, that 
in France cooperation with public research is concentrated in the most technology-
intensive industries, whereas in Germany this type of cooperation is likely to occur in 
almost any industry. This could be a result of the German science policy, which is more 
"diffusion-oriented" than its French counterpart, as was stated in Section 2.2. The sec-
ond cross-country difference observed in Table 3.a, Column (I), concerns the openness 
of the firm. In France, firms that rely (for their innovation process) on information gath-
ered from external sources are more likely to cooperate with public research than the 
other firms. This result, which corroborates some of the findings obtained by Laursen 
and Salter (2004) for the U.K., is not observed in the German model. 
We can now comment the results of the innovation intensity equation, presented in 
Table 3.a, Column (II). We first observe that control variables corresponding to the 
usual determinants of innovation (firm size, innovation expenditures, and industry 
dummies controlling for technological opportunities) are significantly correlated with 
innovation intensity. For the sake of concision, we will not engage in a detailed discus-
sion of these correlations, focusing instead on our main result: the effect of cooperation 
with public research institution. Provided that we have adequately controlled for selec-
tivity and endogeneity, this effect can be interpreted as a causal effect. In France as in 
Germany, cooperation with public research entails a significant increase in the (Logit 
transform) of the share of innovative sales in total sales. This increase is twice as high 
in Germany as it is in France.  
To make interpretation easier, we computed the marginal effect of cooperation on the 
share of innovative sales (rather than on the Logit transform) at the sample mean and 
at the sample median. This computation confirms the large difference observed be-
tween France and Germany: at the sample mean, the marginal effect is equal to 0.13 in 
France and to 0.48 in Germany. At the sample median, the marginal effect is equal to 
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0.17 in France and to 0.49 in Germany. These marginal effects are significant at the 
1% level. They can be interpreted as follows: a marginal effect of, say, 0.13 means that 
(everything else being equal) cooperating with a public research institution entails a 
13% increase in a firm's share of innovative sales. 
4.1.2  Additional tests and robustness checks 
As was said above, the effect of cooperation on innovation intensity can only be inter-
preted as a causal effect insofar as we properly control for selectivity and endogeneity. 
We therefore need to carefully examine the robustness of the estimation, and in par-
ticular the quality of the instruments. First of all, some of the results displayed in Table 
3.a give us useful information regarding selectivity: thus, we see that the inverse Mills 
ratio (which is included as a covariate in order to control for selectivity) has a significant 
effect in the intensity equation (Column II), but not in the cooperation equation (Column 
I). This makes sense, since in our model selection occurs between innovators and non-
innovators (not between cooperating and non-cooperating firms). Therefore, we need 
not worry about the non-significance of the inverse Mills ratio in Column (I). Further-
more, the significance of this ratio in Column (II) is reassuring: it indicates that selectiv-
ity in product innovation has been properly accounted for. 
Now, regarding endogeneity, Table 3.a shows that several of our instruments have a 
significant effect, which is reassuring as far as the overall quality of the estimation is 
concerned. Among the instruments taken from the CIS4 survey itself, four are corre-
lated with the propensity to cooperate with public research. These instruments are the 
same in both countries: the use of secrecy to protect inventions, past sales/profits, high 
innovation costs, and a lack of partners to innovate. Regarding the regional indicators 
used as additional instruments, we observe significance in the French model only. We 
find that the probability to be a product innovator gets higher when the number of 
CRITT in the region where the firm is located increases. 
Table 3.b:  Additional tests and robustness checks 
  France  Germany 
P-value of the Sargan test for overidentification  0.483  0.790 
P-value of the test for endogeneity in the ordinary Heckit model  0.000  0.005 
P-value of inverse Mills ratio in ordinary Heckit (test for selectiv-
ity) 
0.033  0.015 
F-statistic of the Fisher test for weak instruments  24.00***  9.25*** 
Significant at the: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
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Examining the significance of instruments candidates in the cooperation equation is not 
enough to let us conclude on the robustness of our results. This is why we conducted a 
number of additional tests and robustness checks. The outcomes of these tests (pre-
sented in Table 3.b) gave us more confidence regarding the validity of our results. The 
first test we conducted was a Sargan overidentification test, which can be performed 
when more than one instrument is used in an IV regression. As can be seen in the first 
line of Table 3.b, this test is never significant, neither in France nor in Germany. In the 
light of this test, no doubt can be cast on the validity of our list of instruments. 
For the sake of comparison, we then estimated a simple Heckit model, without taking 
into account the fact that the cooperation variable may be endogenous13. In this 
model, the estimated parameter associated with cooperation remains significant, but its 
value falls down to 0.21 (with a standard error of 0.05) in France and to 0.32 (with a 
standard error of 0.02) in Germany. These estimates correspond to a marginal effect of 
cooperation on innovation intensity equal to 0.02 in France (at both the sample mean 
and the sample median), and to 0.07 in Germany (again at both the sample mean and 
the sample median). Comparing these figures to those displayed in Section 4.1.1 sug-
gests that failing to control for endogeneity leads to severely underestimating the mar-
ginal effect of cooperation. 
Given this important difference in the estimated marginal effects, we conducted a test 
for endogeneity in the ordinary Heckit model, thus further validating our main results. 
To conduct this test, we first estimated the reduced-form cooperation equation by OLS, 
and saved its residual. We then re-estimated the ordinary Heckit model described in 
the previous paragraph, this time including the residual of the cooperation equation as 
an additional explanatory variable. If the estimated parameter associated with this addi-
tional variable is significant, there are unobserved factors influencing both the propen-
sity to cooperate and the intensity of innovation. In this case, the cooperation variable 
should be considered as endogenous, and the Heckit model with endogenous regres-
sors presented in Section 4.1.1 should be preferred to the ordinary Heckit model. The 
second line of Table 3.b shows that it is indeed the case: the p-value of this simple test 
for endogeneity is well below 1% in both countries. Moreover, the third line of Table 3.b 
shows that the inverse Mills ratio of the ordinary Heckit model is significant at the 5% in 
both countries. Considered together, these two lines confirm that the ordinary Heckit 
                                                  
13  This model is an ordinary Heckit model, with jut a selection equation (probability to inno-
vate) and an intensity equation (innovation intensity), in which the cooperation indicator is 
treated as an ordinary explanatory variable. 
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model does control for selectivity into product innovation, but not for endogeneity. 
Since our Heckit model with endogenous explanatory variables controls for both, it 
should definitely be preferred to the ordinary Heckit model. 
Our final test consisted in detecting potential weak instruments in our list of instru-
ments. By definition, weak instruments provide a weaker correction for endogeneity 
and may therefore be a source of concern when researchers try to estimate a causal 
effect using IV approaches. To test for weak instruments, we followed the method pro-
posed by Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 105). First, we only estimated the selection 
equation and the cooperation equation in Model (1), thus leaving aside the intensity 
equation. A Fisher test then allowed us to check whether the global effect of our in-
struments in the cooperation equation was significant or not. Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005) explain that if the Fisher test is not significant, then some of the instruments are 
indeed weak instruments. Fortunately, this test was significant in France and in Ger-
many, as can be seen in the fourth and final line of Table 3.b. Thus, we can legitimately 
consider that weak instruments are not a problem in our estimations.  
All of the aforementioned tests therefore reinforce and confirm our main results, as 
stated in Section 4.1.1: in both France and Germany, firms cooperating with public re-
search can expect a significant increase in the intensity of their product innovation. This 
increase is however stronger in Germany than in France. The details of all the addi-
tional estimations conducted for the purpose of tests and robustness checks are avail-
able upon request from the authors. 
4.2  Process innovation 
An additional contribution of the present paper is to examine whether cooperation with 
public research may affect firms' process innovation as well as product innovation. To 
do so, we implemented the same methodology as before, adapting Model (1) to ad-
dress process rather than product innovation. The yi3 indicator in the selection equation 
is now an indicator of process innovation, and we use four alternative proxies in turn to 
capture the intensity of process innovation, yi1. These proxies are (1) the extent of unit 
cost reduction, (2) the extent of cost reduction in materials, (3) the increase in produc-
tion flexibility and (4) the increase in production capacity.  
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These four proxies are categorical variables, ordered from 0 (low) to 3 (high)14. Since 
the focus here is on selectivity and endogeneity, we treat them, in Model (1), as con-
tinuous variables. In the absence of selectivity and endogeneity issues, we could cap-
ture the specificity of these variable using (for instance) an ordered Probit model. In the 
present application, such a model would impose strong (and unrequited) distributional 
assumptions without handling selectivity and endogeneity in the efficient and flexible 
manner granted by Model (1). Since we have grounds for suspecting strong selectivity 
and endogeneity biases, and since ordered variables can be treated (in a first approxi-
mation) as continuous variables, it is definitely preferable to rely on Model (1). 
For the sake of concision, we do not present the parameter estimates of the selection 
and cooperation equations (full tables of results are available on request from the au-
thors). We assume that selection into process innovation is driven by the same deter-
minants as selection into product innovation, including firm size, innovation expendi-
tures, openness of the firm and technological opportunities measured at the industry 
level. In the light of the literature reviewed in Section 3.1, this seems to be a reason-
able assumption. Empirically, the signs of the estimated parameters are the same in-
deed, and do not call for further comments. Similarly, the determinants of cooperation 
with public research institutions are the same as those commented upon in Section 
4.1.1. These similarities are not surprising, since about 60% of process innovators are 
also product innovators and since, conversely, more than 70% of product innovators 
are also process innovators. 
We therefore focus our comments, for the remainder of this section, on the estimates of 
the intensity equation. Table 4 displays the results obtained when the intensity of proc-
ess innovation is measured by the extent of unit cost reduction (first column) and by the 
extent of cost reduction in materials (second column) respectively. Table 5 displays the 
results obtained when the intensity of process innovation is measured by the increase 




                                                  
14  Summary statistics for these variables can be found at the bottom of Table 1.a. 
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Table 4:   Endogenous Heckit procedure, IV regression for process innovation 
(final equation, proxies 1 and 2) 
  Proxy #1: extent of 
unit cost reduction 
Proxy #2: extent of cost 
reduction in materials 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 




0.05  (0.01)*** 0.02  (0.02)  0.04  (0.01)***  -0.02  (0.02) 
DIVERSIFICATION                 
Turnover w/ 3 
main customers  —  0.01  (0.03)  —  -0.01  (0.03) 
DEMAND                 
Obstacles to in-
novation due to 
competition 
0.12  (0.04)*** —  0.10  (0.04)***  — 
Obstacles to in-
novation due to 
demand 




—  0.01  (0.02)  —  0.01  (0.02) 
Importance of 
price competition  —  -0.05  (0.02)**  —  -0.09  (0.03)*** 
MARKET SHARE                 
Relative size of 
main competitors  —  0.02  (0.02)  —  0.02  (0.03) 
OPENNESS OF 








0.11  (0.03)*** 0.00  (0.03)  0.11  (0.03)***  -0.02  (0.03) 
Group as source 




-0.15  (0.19)  0.09  (0.03)**  0.19  (0.19)  0.08  (0.03)** 
INDUSTRY
(1)                 
Hi-/Med-Tech  0.01  (0.08)  0.13  (0.11)  0.30  (0.08)***  0.03  (0.12) 
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  Proxy #1: extent of 
unit cost reduction 
Proxy #2: extent of cost 
reduction in materials 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Manufacturing 
Med-/Low-Tech 
Manufacturing  -0.01  (0.08)  0.22  (0.11)*  0.37  (0.08)***  0.11  (0.12) 
Low-Tech Manu-
facturing  -0.16  (0.08)**  0.14  (0.12)  0.24  (0.08)***  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Knowledge In-
tensive Services  -0.42  (0.08)***  -0.21  (0.10)*  -0.14 (0.08)*  -0.58  (0.11)*** 
Other Services  -0.41  (0.08)***  0.01  (0.12)  0.10  (0.08)  -0.32  (0.13)** 
OTHER 




0.00  (0.00)***  -1.27  (0.51)**  0.00  (0.00)***  -0.70  (0.54) 
Company is part 
of a group  0.13  (0.03)***  -0.07  (0.06)  0.08  (0.03)**  0.02  (0.07) 
Eastern Ger-




0.31  (0.15)**  0.82  (0.37)**  0.68  (0.16)***  1.88  (0.40)*** 
SELECTIVITY 
CORRECTION                 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.29  (0.16)*  Not significant  0.07  (0.17)  Not significant 
Tests on instru-




0.235  0.410  0.022  0.940 
P-value, test for 
endogeneity in 
Heckit 
0.179  0.010  0.000  0.000 
P-value, test for 
selectivity in Heckit  0.017  0.230  0.570  0.350 
F-statistic, Fisher 
test for weak in-
struments 
58.39***  11.49***  78.95***  11.51*** 
(1) The reference category is "Manufacturing – High technological intensity". 
The Fisher test for the global fit of the IV regression is significant at the 1% level for both France 
and Germany. 
Significant at the: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
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Table 5:  Endogenous Heckit procedure, IV regression for process innovation 
(final equation, proxies 3 and 4) 
  Proxy#3: increase in 
production flexibility 
Proxy#3: increase in 
production capacity 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. 
Err. 
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 




0.00  (0.01)  0.04  (0.04)  0.00  (0.01)  -0.07  (0.02)*** 
DIVERSIFICATION                 
Turnover w/ 3 
main customers  —  0.05  (0.03)  —  0.04  (0.04) 
DEMAND                 
Obstacles to in-
novation due to 
competition 
0.07  (0.04)*  —  0.08  (0.04)**  — 
Obstacles to in-
novation due to 
demand 




—  0.01  (0.03)  —  0.02  (0.03) 
Importance of 
price competition  —  0.04  (0.04)  —  -0.08  (0.02)*** 
MARKET SHARE                 
Relative size of 
main competitors  —  -0.01 (0.02)  —  0.03  (0.03) 
OPENNESS OF 








0.09  (0.03)***  0.18  (0.04)***  0.09  (0.03)***  0.01  (0.03) 
Group as source 




-0.19  (0.19)  0.04  (0.04)  -0.07  (0.20)  0.04  (0.04) 
INDUSTRY
(1)                 
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  Proxy#3: increase in 
production flexibility 
Proxy#3: increase in 
production capacity 
  France  Germany  France  Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Err. 
Hi-/Med-Tech 
Manufacturing  -0.01  (0.08)  0.02  (0.11)  0.04  (0.08)  0.13  (0.13) 
Med-/Low-Tech 
Manufacturing  -0.09  (0.08)  0.45  (0.13)  0.09  (0.08)  0.35  (0.13)*** 
Low-Tech Manu-
facturing  -0.05  (0.08)  0.25  (0.13)*  0.00  (0.08)  0.24  (0.14)* 
Knowledge Inten-
sive Services  -0.04  (0.08)  0.29  (0.12)**  0.01  (0.08)  -0.03  (0.12) 
Other Services  -0.15  (0.08)*  0.23  (0.13)*  -0.06  (0.08)  -0.13  (0.14) 
OTHER 




0.00  (0.00)**  -0,34 (0.54)  0.00  (0.00)*  -0.24  (0.58) 
Company is part 
of a group  0.10  (0.03)***  -0.20 (0.07)***  0.02  (0.03)  0.01  (0.07) 




0.46  (0.15)***  1.33  (0.46)***  0.31  (0.15) **  1.63  (0.43)*** 
SELECTIVITY 
CORRECTION                 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.24  (0.16)  1.19  (0.40)***  -0.20  (0.17)  Not significant 
Tests on instru-




0.039  0.609  0.123  0.910 
P-value, test for 
endogeneity in 
Heckit 
0.017  0.000  0.136  0.000 
P-value, test for 
selectivity in Heckit  0.037  0.000  0.024  0.750 
F-statistic, Fisher 
test for weak in-
struments 
58.39***  9.75***  80.71***  11.08*** 
(1) The reference category is "Manufacturing – High technological intensity". 
The Fisher test for the global fit of the IV regression is significant at the 1% level for both France 
and Germany. 
Significant at the: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
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Depending on which proxy we use for process innovation, the significance of the con-
trol variables may vary (for the sake of concision, we will not give detailed comments 
on the significance of the controls). By contrast, our main result is clear-cut and ex-
tremely consistent across all four specifications of the model and across both countries: 
cooperation with a public research institution always entails a significant increase in the 
intensity of process innovation. No matter which proxy we use for process innovation, 
the magnitude of the increase is always more than twice as high in Germany as it is in 
France. It seems therefore that the returns on cooperation (in terms of innovation in-
tensity) are always higher in Germany than in France, not only for product, but also for 
process innovation. 
As was the case in Section 4.1, the effect of cooperation we measure here can be in-
terpreted as a causal effect, provided we have adequately controlled for selectivity and 
endogeneity. To examine the quality of this control, we conducted the same series of 
test as in Section 4.1.2. The outcomes of these tests are reported at the bottom of Ta-
ble 4 and Table 5. We first checked the relevance of our list of instruments with a Sar-
gan overidentification test, which, in most cases, was not significant. The two excep-
tions occurred for France, in the models where process innovation is measured by a 
cost reduction in materials, and by an increase in production flexibility, respectively. 
This result suggests that, in these two cases, there is at least one redundant instrument 
in our list. We experimented with various lists of instruments, and with dropping some 
of the instruments, but never managed to get the significance of the test over the 5% 
level. These two exceptions (out of eight estimations) should not obfuscate, however, 
that the Sargan test is generally not significant. This means that, overall, our list of in-
struments performs fairly well. 
We then conducted a test for endogeneity, following the procedure described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2, i.e. by estimating an ordinary Heckit model with the predicted residual from 
the reduced-form cooperation equation added to the regressors. In six models of out 
the eight we estimated, the test was significant. It means that overall the Heckit model 
with endogenous regressors should be preferred to the ordinary Heckit model (as was 
already the case in our analysis of product innovation). Again, the two exceptions occur 
for France, this time in the models where process innovation is measured by the extent 
of unit cost reduction, and by an increase in production capacity, respectively. Note, 
however, that in both cases, the p-value of the test is very close to the conventional 
level of significance of 10%, which still pleads in favour of the Heckit with endogenous 
explanatory variables. 
Moreover, as in Section 4.1.2, we tested for selectivity in addition to testing for en-
dogeneity. In four cases out of eight, the test was not significant, which suggests that 
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selectivity is less of an issue when we study process innovation than it was when we 
studied product innovation. This is also reflected in the fact that the Inverse Mills ratio 
of the Heckit model with endogenous regressors is often not significant, as can be seen 
in Tables 4 and 5. Still, there is evidence of selectivity in several of the estimations, and 
we should not neglect overall to control for the potential selection bias. Taken together, 
these last two tests plead for the use of the Heckit model with endogenous regressors, 
which allows us to control for both selectivity and endogeneity. 
Finally, we tested for weak instruments using the Cameron and Trivedi (2005) proce-
dure detailed in Section 4.1.2. The Fisher test statistics reported at the bottom of Ta-
bles 4 and 5 are always significantly different from zero. This means that we do not 
have to fear an imperfect control for selectivity arising from weak instruments. To put it 
in a nutshell, the results of our series of tests are strong enough to validate our model 
overall (even though there are indications that the estimations may occasionally be less 
robust for process than they were for product innovation). We can therefore conclude 
that cooperation with public research entails not only more product innovation, but also 
more process innovation. With both types of innovation, the observed effect of coop-
eration is much larger in Germany than in France. 
5  Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we evaluated the impact of cooperation with public research institutions 
on firms' innovative activities. To do so, we estimated an innovation production function 
on the fourth wave of the CIS (CIS4). Our contribution to the literature was threefold. 
First, we proposed an econometric methodology that addresses both selection and 
endogeneity issues. Second, our analysis encompassed not only product innovation, 
but also process innovation. Last but not least, we followed an international comparison 
approach, concentrating on two countries: France and Germany. This allowed us to 
draw an in-depth descriptive comparison of the national contexts of public-private col-
laborations in research, before examining our comparative econometric results. 
These results show a positive effect of cooperation with public research on the intensity 
of product innovation (measured by the share of innovative sales) in both countries. 
This effect is however twice as high in Germany is it in France. Similarly, we find a 
positive effect of cooperation on the intensity of process innovation in both countries 
(no matter which proxy we use to measure process innovation). Again, this effect is 
much higher in Germany than in France. While these results answer our main interro-
gation, they raise a new question: how can we explain the observed difference be-
tween France and Germany?  
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One possible explanation lies in the differences in science policy highlighted in our 
comparison of the national institutional contexts. As mentioned in Section 2.2, public 
support to collaborations between firms and public research labs is decentralised in 
Germany. It relies mostly on the technology transfer offices of the German universities. 
By contrast, in France, different instruments coexist at different levels, from very cen-
tralized national policies to regional and local incentive structures. Although the public 
effort in creating and sustaining public/private partnerships in research is not less than 
in Germany, this proliferation of instruments generates some confusion as well as mul-
tiple costs. In this context, firms may find it difficult to identify the proper public partner 
for starting a collaborative research. Moreover, multiple costs can lead to a dispersion 
of public resources, which may result in less effective support to research partnerships. 
From a national policy perspective, this suggests that the innovation clusters created in 
France in the recent years (as mentioned in Section 2.2) might not yield the expected 
results, if they simply come as an additional layer in an already overly complex set of 
institutions. 
Finally, even though our analysis highlights the positive impact of cooperation with pub-
lic research on firms' innovativeness, we should refrain from jumping to conclusions as 
far as policy implications are concerned. In particular, since our data did not allow us to 
conduct a complete costs/benefits analysis (comparing private and social costs to pri-
vate and social returns), we cannot say that cooperation must be encouraged at all 
cost. It can indeed have hidden social costs, for instance if it leads public research in-
stitutions to focus only on applied research and to forego fundamental research. Exam-
ining such issues remains an interesting topic for further research. 
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